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In recent years, international capital flows of all types have increased dramatically and most
governments have been actively encouraging inflows of direct investment. However, concerns
remain that reliance on foreign multinationals may be a risky development strategy as foreign firms
are likely to be less rooted in the local economy and may be quicker to close down production. This
paper asks whether foreign owners are more likely to close plants than domestic owners. In
Indonesia, plants with any foreign ownership are far less likely to close than wholly-owned domestic
plants. However, the lower probability of shutdown is a result of the larger size of foreign plants
rather than their nationality of ownership. Controlling for plant size and productivity, we find that
foreign plants are significantly more likely to close than comparable domestic establishments.
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1. Introduction
The behavior of multinational corporations in developing countries is
the subject of contentious, intense debate. Proponents of direct investment
by foreign multinationals point to higher wages, technology transfer, access
to markets, and increased product market competition. Detractors focus
on lower labor and environmental standards and weak links to the local
community. The opinions of potential host countries have changed over
time. In the immediate post-colonial period, many developing countries
were sceptical of foreign direct investment and associated foreign capital
inﬂows with a loss of domestic sovereignty. Recently, international capital
ﬂows of all types have increased dramatically and most governments have
been actively encouraging inﬂows of direct investment by foreign multina-
tionals through marketing, tax incentives, and outright subsidies. However,
concerns remain that reliance on foreign multinationals may be a risky de-
velopment strategy as foreign ﬁrms are likely to be less rooted in the local
economy and may be quicker to close down production. In this paper,
we test whether foreign ownership is associated with plant survival in the
context of a developing economy.
Research on multinationals has tended to concentrate on plant location
choices, characteristics of ﬁrms that become multinationals, and the eﬀects
of foreign operations on domestic (home) labor markets.1 Research on
the eﬀects of foreign direct investment on host countries is less common,
especially for developing countries, and has focused primarily on potential
productivity spillovers.2 Given the increasing importance of multinationals
in manufacturing employment in developing countries, there is a surprising
absence of work on the host country performance of multinational plants,
especially on aspects of plant survival and labor demand.3
Rodrik (1997) and others argue that increased trade and foreign invest-
ment may have led to increases in the elasticity of labor demand. While
1Examples of recent work in these three areas include Markusen (2002) Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2003), and Blomström, Fors and Lipsey (1997).
2See Haddad and Harrison (1993) [Morroco], Aitken and Harrison (1999) [Venezuela],
and Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) [Indonesia]. Lipsey (2002) surveys the literature on
home and host country eﬀects of foreign direct investment.
3Almost all the existing research on multinational behavior in developing country
labor markets concentrates on wage levels, e.g. Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004).Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 3
numerous studies have documented increases in labor market volatility in
OECD countries, see Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003), to our knowl-
edge no studies have asked whether multinationals survive longer in devel-
oping countries, or whether they have diﬀerent labor demand elasticities.
Indeed, even in developed economies, few studies have examined if
foreign-owned ﬁrms are more likely than domestically-owned ﬁrms to exit
the domestic market. Looking at U.S. manufacturing plant deaths, Bernard
and Jensen (2002) ﬁnd that plants owned by U.S. multinationals are sub-
stantially less likely to close than other U.S. plants over ﬁve year intervals.
However, they also ﬁnd that controlling for establishment, ﬁrm, and indus-
try characteristics, U.S. multinationals are more likely to close a domestic
plant. Görg and Strobl (2003) ﬁnd that Irish plants with majority foreign
ownership are more likely to exit their sample of manufacturing plants,
where exit can be either due to closure or a change in ownership.
Our paper provides the ﬁrst evidence on the relationship between foreign
ownership and plant survival in a developing country. Using data from
1975-1989 on Indonesian manufacturing establishments, we ask whether
foreign ownership and the characteristics of foreign plants are associated
with increased ﬂexibility on the extensive margin, i.e. plant shutdowns.
Our study has the advantage of using data on a large number of plants over
a long time period where failure, characteristics, and foreign ownership are
recorded for each plant every year.
Using a semiparametric estimation of the hazard function, we ﬁnd that
plants with some foreign ownership are far less likely to close down com-
pared to plants that are completely domestically-owned. However, the
higher survival rate among foreign-owned plants is caused by plant char-
acteristics rather than by their nationality of ownership; foreign plants
are much larger and have dramatically higher levels of productivity than
domestically-owned plants. Controlling for such characteristics reveals that
foreign ownership is associated with an increased probability of closure.
Using information on changes of ownership (domestic ↔ foreign), we con-
ﬁrm that foreign ownership, rather than unobserved plant characteristics,
is associated with the lower survival rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the
literature on ﬁrms and plant shutdowns. Section 3 describes the data.
In Section 4, we estimate the hazard function and identify the eﬀects ofForeign Owners and Plant Survival 4
foreign ownership. Section 5 concludes.
2. Firms, Ownership and Plant Survival
Our paper asks whether the nationality of ownership is correlated with
plant survival. Plant exit has been the subject of a large number of studies
all of which have documented the importance of plant and industry charac-
teristics for plant survival. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, 1989)
established that plant survival is positively associated with both plant age
and size and that exit rates vary across industries and persist over time.
Subsequent studies have repeatedly conﬁrmed these ﬁndings for diﬀerent
time periods in diﬀerent countries, e.g. Disney, Haskel, and Haden (2003).
T h er o l eo fﬁrm characteristics, including the nationality of ownership,
in plant failure is less well understood. The theoretical literature on the
role of ﬁrms in plant closures focuses on behavior in declining industries,
e.g. Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985), and is generally limited to a discussion
of the interaction of plant size and multi-plant ﬁr m s . T h er o l eo fm u l t i n a -
tionals in plant survival, or host country labor demand more generally, is
absent from the theoretical literature.
Work in related areas implicitly suggests that ﬁrms with cross-border
operations should be relatively ﬂexible in terms of labor demand, see Help-
man (1984) and Feenstra and Hanson (1997). In comparison with purely
domestic ﬁrms, multinationals either have an enhanced ability to shift pro-
duction between various locations within the ﬁrm, establish new production
locations at a relatively lower cost, or more easily source inputs from for-
eign plants that are substitutes for local labor.4 All these factors should
increase use of the extensive shutdown margin for foreign ﬁrms relative
to domestic ﬁrms. However, foreign multinationals may face substantially
higher sunk costs of plant creation in developing countries than do com-
parable domestic ﬁrms. Higher sunk entry costs should lead to lower exit
rates for foreign ﬁrms, especially for greenﬁeld investments. A recent set
of empirical papers has argued that multinationals may actually improve
plant performance during times of crisis by shielding them from liquidity
4Brainard and Riker (1997) argue that employment at aﬃliates of U.S. multinationals
in less developed economies is a complement to employment in aﬃliates in developed
countries.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 5
constraints, thus presumably increasing their chances for survival.5
Empirical work on ﬁrm characteristics such as ownership and plant exit
is also relatively limited. Bernard and Jensen (2002) ﬁnd that uncon-
ditional survival probabilities are higher for U.S. plants that are part of
multi-plant and multinational ﬁrms. Conditioning on plant characteristics,
they ﬁnd reduced survival rates at those same ﬁrm types. Görg and Strobl
(2003) also ﬁnd increased probabilities of exit for Irish plants that are ma-
jority foreign-owned. Disney et al (2003) ﬁnd diﬀerences in exit behavior
for stand-alone and group establishments. This paper adds to this recent
literature by explicitly separating the eﬀects of ownership from the role of
plant characteristics and by providing the ﬁrst study of plant survival in a
developing country context.
3. Foreign-owned plants in Indonesia, 1975-1989
Indonesia has changed its policy towards foreign direct investment con-
siderably over the years. After independence in 1949, Indonesia pursued
an inward looking development policy with severe restrictions on foreign
multinationals. Foreign ﬁrms were only allowed in some sectors of the
economy and some Dutch ﬁrms were even nationalized by the Indonesian
government. This suspicion of foreign interests in general and of foreign
multinationals in particular, was caused by a host of factors, ranging from
the generally accepted development paradigm of the 1950s, to the experi-
ence of colonization under the Dutch, and an attempt by President Sukarno
to unite the ethnically very heterogeneous country by a supposed foreign
threat to the nation.
The restrictive policy towards foreign direct investment continued,
with a brief period of a more outward looking policy in the late 1960s, until
the beginning of the 1980s when falling prices of oil and other raw-materials
forced Indonesia to change development strategy. Manufacturing was em-
phasized and developed partly through inﬂows of foreign multinationals.
The reforms included reductions in import licensing restrictions and relax-
5Blalock, Gertler, and Levine (2003) and Amiti and Wei (2003) focus on Indonesian
plants during the ﬁnancial crisis in the late 1990s. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2003)
consider the relative performance of U.S. multinational aﬃliate in a number of currency
crises. However, none of these papers explicitly considers the eﬀects of multinational
ownership on plant survival.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 6
ation of foreign investment rules. Our study spans several of these foreign
investment regimes, starting in 1975 and continuing through 1989.
3.1. Data
One reason for the lack of empirical studies on ownership and plant
survival rates is the relatively high data requirement for such an analysis.
Starting with a panel of plants and their characteristics over time (now
available from numerous countries), one needs to have information on the
national origin of ownership, which is often not collected in economic cen-
suses. Secondly, the survey must accurately record plant deaths separately
from other reasons for exiting the sample such as a change in ownership or
the level of employment falling below a sampling threshold.6
For this paper we use information from the Indonesian manufacturing
census which has been collected annually since 1975.7 From 1975 to 1989,
once a plant entered the manufacturing census sample, it was kept in the
sample until its failure. Data was also collected on the ownership shares in
the hands of public-domestic, private-domestic, and foreign entities. While
the annual Indonesian manufacturing censuses continued after 1989, begin-
ning in 1990 plants were excluded from the sample if their size fell below
20 employees. Thus it is not possible to know if a plant exits in the 1990s
because of a closure or because of a decrease in size. Since small plants are
likely to have a relatively high exit rate (Bernard and Jensen, 2002, Disney
et al, 2003) and since foreign plants tend to be relatively large, this is likely
to seriously bias any results on ownership and plant closure. As a result
we must restrict our analysis to data between 1975 and 1989 and cannot
include the 1990s, a period of substantial growth in foreign investment into
Indonesia.
Before we formally test for any relationship between foreign ownership
and plant exit, we provide a brief description of the data. The share of
manufacturing employment and value added for plants with some foreign
ownership is given in Table 1. The foreign share of value added is higher
than the foreign share of employment, reﬂecting higher labor productivity
6In the Irish data used by Görg and Strobl (2003), plants exit if they change owners
regardless of nationality.
7Our data includes revisions from the so-called ‘backcast’ sample which provides im-
portant corrections for errors in the raw data.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 7
in foreign-owned plants. The foreign share is relatively constant during the
sample at around 8 percent of employment and 20 percent of value added.
However, output and employment shares accounted by foreign plants vary
across industries; they are relatively high in Fabricated Metal Products and
relatively low in Food Products and in Paper and Pulp. In our econometric
analysis, we allow for diﬀerences in survival rates by industry.
Foreign ownership usually coincides with foreign control during this
period, as seen in Figure 1. More than 80 percent of the plants with
some foreign ownership are majority foreign-owned, although wholly-owned
foreign plants are far less common, only 15% of the sample. The median
‘foreign’ plant has both foreign and domestic owners with 70 percent of the
capital in foreign hands.
Table 2 shows the fraction of foreign and domestic plants that are still
operating after one and ﬁve years. Across industries the one year survival
rate is typically lower for domestic than for foreign plants, ranging from 91-
100 percent. After ﬁve years, the diﬀerence between foreign and domestic
plants has increased: 68-83 percent of foreign plants and between 59-78
percent of domestic plants are still operating. The exit rate diﬀers between
sectors and is relatively high in Wood products and low in Chemicals.
These one and ﬁve year survival rates suggest that foreign plants have
a lower propensity than domestic plants to shut down. However, this is
not necessarily caused by the diﬀerences in ownership since foreign and do-
mestic plants might diﬀer in characteristics that aﬀect the likelihood of a
closure. Table 3 compares the size, age and productivity of domestically-
owned and foreign-owned plants. The average size of a foreign plant in-
creases from 207 employees in 1975 to about 372 in 1989. The correspond-
ing size for domestically-owned plants is substantially smaller, 87 and 141
employees in 1975 and 1989 respectively. Foreign plants are larger than do-
mestic plants in all years and in all industries with the exception of Basic
Metal, i.e. iron and steel plants.
Our productivity measure is the percent deviation from the mean plant
labor productivity level in the industry and year. By this measure, foreign-
owned plants are almost twice as productive as the average plant in 1975,
while wholly-domestic plants have productivity levels 3.4 percent below the
average. The gap in productivity between foreign-owned and domestically-
owned plants is found in every sector in all years and seems to increaseForeign Owners and Plant Survival 8
over time. Age shows no systematic diﬀerences across ownership types;
domestic plants are slightly older than foreign plants in 1975 but there is
no diﬀerence in age in 1989.
The results presented here suggest that domestically-owned plants have
a higher exit rate than foreign-owned plants but they are also smaller and
less productive. In the next section, we continue with an econometric analy-
sis to further disentangle the eﬀect of ownership on plant closure from the
eﬀects of other plant characteristics.
4. Estimation
In this paper, we consider the role of foreign ownership on employment
adjustment through the extensive margin, i.e. plant shutdown.8 Unlike
many settings in economics, we are not fundamentally interested in the
shape of the baseline hazard, but instead focus on the eﬀect of covariates
on the hazard. As a result, we employ a semiparametric Cox proportional
hazard model for most of our estimations. This assumes that the hazard,
λ(t;x), takes the form,
λ(t;xt)=l i m
h↓0
P (t ≤ T ≤ t + h|T ≥ t,xt)
h
= κ(xt)λ0 (t) (1)
where κ(·) is a nonnegative function of xt and λ0 (t) > 0 is the baseline
hazard (see Wooldridge (2002)).9
We start by considering the simplest nonparametric estimate of the
survivor function, S(t), i.e. the probability of surviving past time t.T h e









where nj i st h en u m b e ro fp l a n t st h a th a v es u r v i v e dt otj years of age and dj
is the number of plants that die at age tj. Figure 2 shows a nonparametric
8Of equal interest is whether employment volatility or job duration are higher at
foreign-owned plants. We leave this to future research.
9Parametric estimations assuming Weibull (proportional and accelerated time), Gom-
pertz, log-normal or Gamma distributions yielded identical conclusions.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 9
estimate of the survivor function for two types of plants: those with no
foreign ownership and those with some foreign ownership. Analysis time
represents the number of years that the plant has been in the sample.
These results conﬁrm our priors about the relative survival performance
of foreign-owned and domestic plants. Survival probabilities are signiﬁ-
cantly higher at all time horizons for foreign-owned plants. After ﬁfteen
years the cumulative probability of exit is almost twice as large for domestic
plants (68%) than for foreign plants (39%). However, these nonparametric
estimates do not give us information on the source of the lower hazards for
foreign plants.
4.1. Ownership and plant characteristics
In this section we consider the nature of the survival advantage for
foreign-owned ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether foreign ownership it-
self is linked to improved survival probabilities or whether foreign-owned
plants have characteristics associated with lower failure probabilities. The
research described in section 2 suggests that hazard rates are likely to vary
across industries, in particular due to sunk costs of entry. We allow the
baseline hazard, λ0 (t), to vary by industry, region, and year of initial opera-
tion, λ0 (t)=λi,r,sy,0 (t). This allows us to control for geography, industry,
and cohort eﬀects in a nonparametric fashion. The eﬀects of ownership
type and plant characteristics shift the hazard proportional to these base-
lines.10
Row (I) in Table 4 conﬁrms the nonparametric result given above. For-
eign plants have a signiﬁcantly lower hazard ratio than domestic plants
(0.57). Similarly in Row II, we ﬁnd that plants with some public own-
ership (public) also have a signiﬁcantly lower hazard than privately held
plants.11
To check the source of these higher survival probabilities, we ﬁrst add
the natural log of employment to control for the large variation in plant size
between foreign and domestic plants. Size is strongly negatively related to
the hazard, and, in fact, is suﬃcient to fully explain the improved survival
chances of both foreign and public plants, as seen in Rows III-V in Table 4.
10None of the conclusions are sensitive to this stratiﬁcation of the baseline hazards.
11Restricting the sample to just domestic ﬁrms left the results on public ownership
unchanged as did including the foreign ownership dummy.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 10
After the inclusion of plant size, neither foreign-owned nor publicly-owned
plants show any better survival performance. This result strongly suggests
that neither foreign nor public ownership provide improved survival chances
beyond the larger size of the plants.
In row VI, we estimate the hazard with the ownership dummies and
a measure of plant productivity. The productivity variable is deﬁned as
the percent diﬀerence in value-added per worker at the plant from that
at the average plant in the industry in the year. This within-industry
labor productivity measure is less than ideal as it captures a variety of
eﬀects beyond diﬀerences in multi-factor productivity, including diﬀerential
mark-ups across plants and variation in capital intensity.12 The labor
productivity measure is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with plant
survival. However, while it reduces the estimated eﬀects of both types of
ownership, it does not completely undue them.
Finally, we estimate the hazard with both ownership variables, size and
productivity in Row VII. Now we ﬁnd that foreign-owned plants have
signiﬁcantly higher hazards than comparable domestic plants. Adjusting
for the beneﬁcial eﬀects of their larger size and greater labor productivity,
foreign-owned plants are 20% more likely to close in any year than domestic
plants. In contrast, public ownership remains uncorrelated with survival.
As a robustness check, in Table 5, we consider the eﬀects of additional
plant characteristics on the estimated hazard.13 In Row VIII, we include
the share of white collar workers at the plant as a measure of the composi-
tion of the workforce and the share of inputs that are imported to proxy for
foreign exposure of the plant. In Row IX, we supplement the speciﬁcation
with log inputs per employee, log energy used per employee (a proxy for
capital), and the log wage per worker, all measured as percent deviations
from the value at the average plant. The addition of these variables does
not aﬀect the sign, magnitude, or signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient on
foreign ownership, public ownership, size or productivity. Foreign-owned
plants remain signiﬁcantly more likely to fail (22-31 percent) than compa-
rable domestic establishments while public ownership neither improves nor
12We are limited in the construction of plant performance measures by the absence of
both measures of capital stocks and adequate industry price deﬂators.
13The estimates in this table run from 1978-1989 as imported input shares are not
recorded from 1975-1977. None of the results are sensitive to this change in the sample.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 11
harms plant survival.14
4.2. Types of foreign plants
Our data permit us to examine the eﬀect of foreign ownership in more
detail. First, we ask whether the increased hazard at foreign-owned plants
diﬀers according to whether the plant had foreign capital from the begin-
ning (greenﬁeld) or whether some fraction of the capital was purchased by
a foreign entity after startup (takeover).15 If foreign ownership itself in-
creases the hazard, then both the greenﬁeld and takeover measures should
be greater than one. If, instead, the higher foreign hazard is associated
with attributes of the plant itself, it should appear for greenﬁeld plants
but not for plants that are acquired by foreign owners. In Table 6 we ﬁnd
that both types of foreign-owned plants have higher hazards than domestic
plants. In fact, the hazard ratio for acquired plants is higher than that
for greenﬁeld plants. We also include a dummy for domestic plants that
previously had foreign ownership. The “formerly-foreign” plants do not
have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent hazards than other domestic plants.
These results suggests that foreign ownership itself may be the source of
the increased shutdown probability rather than unobserved plant character-
istics associated with foreign-owned establishments. The higher hazards
for foreign plants appear at plants that switch from domestic to foreign
ownership but they do not persist after a sale back to domestic owners.
Finally, we check whether the degree of foreign holdings aﬀects the
probability of closure. As noted above, more than 80% of the plants
with any foreign ownership are majority-owned (50+%) by foreigners. In
Table 7, we allow for diﬀerential eﬀects of majority and minority foreign
ownership.16 Both types of foreign-owned plants have higher hazards,
14Higher imported input shares are associated with a signiﬁcantly lower probability
of plant shutdown. High levels of imported inputs may signal plants of higher quality,
such as exporters. Higher shares of white collar workers are surprisingly associated with
higher hazard rates. Instead of signalling a more skilled workforce, this variable may
instead capture plants that are at odds with Indonesia’s comparative advantage or plants
with large numbers of ineﬃcient overhead staﬀ.
15The "takeover" dummy is zero in the years before the ownership changes hands, and
one while there is positive foreign ownership.
16It is likely that even the plants with foreign holdings below 50% are in fact controlled
by foreign ﬁrms. The mean foreign ownership at these "minority" plants is 38%.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 12
although the coeﬃcient for foreign minority-owned plants is signiﬁcant at
only the 11% level.17 We are unable to reject the equality of the coeﬃcients
for the majority and minority dummies and a joint test that the hazard
ratios are equal to one is rejected at the 5% level leading us to conclude
that there is no substantial diﬀerence in the eﬀects of majority and minority
holdings by foreigners.
5. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the relationship between foreign ownership
and plant survival in a developing country. Using data from 1975-1989
for the Indonesian manufacturing sector, we ﬁnd that plants with some
foreign ownership have dramatically lower failure probabilities than plants
with only domestic owners in the same industry and region. However,
these same foreign-owned plants are also substantially diﬀerent from their
domestic counterparts in terms of size and productivity, factors that work
to reduce the probability of shutdown.
Controlling for size and productivity, we ﬁnd that foreign-owned plants
are 20 percent more likely to close than purely domestic plants. To check
whether our results are driven by the characteristics of the plant, we exam-
ine changes of ownership from domestic to foreign and back. We ﬁnd that
foreign greenﬁe l dp l a n t sa n df o r e i g na c q u i s i t i o n so fd o m e s t i cp l a n t sh a v e
similar, signiﬁcantly higher hazards than any type of domestic plant.
Relative to the average domestic plant, foreign plants have desirable
characteristics that reduce their probability of failure. At the same time,
the presence of foreign owners substantially decreases the plant survival
rate. Multinational ﬁrms use the extensive margin available to them to
close plants more often than their domestic counterparts. Our results sug-
gest that work on multinationals both at home and abroad should explicitly
control for increased plant hazard rates, e.g. the higher wages for workers
at multinational plants after controlling for size and other characteristics
m a yi np a r tr e ﬂect the higher probability of plant shutdown. In light of the
explosion of foreign direct investment in recent years, substantial further
research is needed to explore the role of multinationals in both home and
17This is probably due to the relatively small sample size, the coeﬃcient is actually
larger for this group.Foreign Owners and Plant Survival 13
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Sector 1975 1989
Total employment 7.7 8.0
value added 19.6 22.5
Food employment 3.8 3.7
value added 16.7 7.5
Textiles employment 7.4 8.4
value added 25.3 21.9
Wood employment 11.1 8.0
value added 23.9 13.8
Paper employment 7.2 4.1
value added 17.4 11.3
Chemicals employment 13.9 10.9
value added 21.8 24.4
Non-Metal employment 6.8 5.4
value added 12.0 17.5
Basic Metal employment 6.8 5.4
value added 16.3 24.9
Fabricated Metal employment 17.0 15.9
value added 22.6 52.1
Other employment 4.5 6.0
value added 1.7 17.3
Foreign share
Table 1: Share of industry employment and output by ownership typeForeign Owners and Plant Survival 18
Sector ISIC domestic foreign domestic foreign
All 0.93         0.96         0.68          0.78         
Food 31 0.93         0.97         0.69          0.83         
Textiles 32 0.91         0.94         0.65          0.78         
Wood 33 0.90         0.92         0.59          0.68         
Paper 34 0.94         1.00         0.76          0.78         
Chemicals 35 0.98         0.96         0.78          0.80         
Non-metal 36 0.95         0.88         0.67          0.81         
Basic Metal  37 1.00         1.00         0.78          0.70         
Fabricated Metal  38 0.98         1.00         0.75          0.78         
Fraction remaining
One year later Five years later
Note: Foreign plants are those with any amount of foreign ownership in the initial 
year.
Table 2: Survival rates by industry and ownershipForeign Owners and Plant Survival 19
Sector Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
All Size (employees) 87 207 141 372
Productivity (% deviation) -3.4 98.8 -5.3 159.5
Age (years) 10.7 9.5 12.7 12.9
Number of plants 7162 250 13898 462
Food Size (employees) 111 166 133 301
Productivity (% deviation) -2.6 101 -3.5 205.4
Age (years) 11.7 16.6 14.7 16.4
Number of plants 2253 59 4133 71
Textile Size (employees) 79 416 153 735
Productivity (% deviation) -1.2 79 -2.8 146.2
Age (years) 10.9 10.7 12.8 12.4
Number of plants 2258 34 3129 60
Wood Size (employees) 58 146 185 570
Productivity (% deviation) -1.7 33.3 -3.1 109
Age (years) 7.8 8.8 8.1 10.5
Number of plants 482 24 1629 46
Paper Size (employees) 69 157 99 286
Productivity (% deviation) -4.4 130.4 -1.7 111.5
Age (years) 14.5 4.7 16.4 12.1
Number of plants 324 11 608 9
Chemicals Size (employees) 85 146 158 225
Productivity (% deviation) -12.4 131.1 -13.5 156.3
Age (years) 9.6 7 13 14.1
Number of plants 601 57 1666 144
Non-metal Size (employees) 50 260 80 421
Productivity (% deviation) -1.5 110 -2.3 206.5
Age (years) 9.1 11.4 11.5 10.3
Number of plants 570 8 1184 13
Basic metal Size (employees) 167 96 548 535
Productivity (% deviation) -9.6 35.2 -16.1 60.4
Age (years) 3.9 2 9.4 7
Number of plants 11 3 30 8
Fabricated metal Size (employees) 98 222 139 319
Productivity (% deviation) -9.1 100.6 -13.9 168
Age (years) 9.6 4.8 11.8 10.9
Number of plants 589 53 1293 107
Other Size (employees) 48 167 86 313
Productivity (% deviation) -0.3 20.6 -2.9 164.8
Age (years) 10 4 10.3 12.3
Number of plants 74 1 226 4
1975 1989
Note: Domestic plants have 100 percent domestic ownership.  Foreign plants have some 
foreign ownership.  Productivity is measured as the percent deviation in value-added per 
worker for the average plant in the industry for that year.
Table 3: Average plant characteristics by industry and ownershipForeign Owners and Plant Survival 20
1975-1989
Specification Variable Hazard Ratio Std.Err. z p-value
(I) foreign 0.57 0.04 -7.38 0.00
(II) public 0.61 0.04 -7.62 0.00
(III) foreign 1.04 0.08 0.49 0.63
log employment 0.58 0.01 -38.52 0.00
(IV) public 0.93 0.06 -1.20 0.23
log employment 0.58 0.01 -38.41 0.00
(V) foreign 1.03 0.08 0.44 0.66
public 0.93 0.06 -1.18 0.24
log employment 0.58 0.01 -38.10 0.00
(VI) foreign 0.76 0.06 -3.57 0.00
public 0.69 0.04 -5.76 0.00
labor productivity 0.79 0.01 -24.26 0.00
(VII) foreign 1.22 0.10 2.57 0.01
public 0.98 0.06 -0.25 0.80
log employment 0.60 0.01 -34.61 0.00
labor productivity 0.85 0.01 -15.62 0.00
Note: The baseline hazard is allowed to vary over region-industry-startyear groups.
All standard errors are clustered on plants. Labor productivity is measured as the
percent difference in value-added per worker from the average plant in the industry-
year group.
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Specification Variable Hazard Ratio Std.Err. z p-value
(VIII) foreign 1.26 0.11 2.71 0.01
public 0.97 0.07 -0.50 0.62
log employment 0.60 0.01 -32.56 0.00
labor productivity 0.86 0.01 -13.84 0.00
white collar labor share 1.36 0.10 4.03 0.00
imported input share 0.91 0.05 -1.87 0.06
(IX) foreign 1.31 0.11 3.12 0.00
public 0.99 0.07 -0.10 0.92
log employment 0.60 0.01 -30.68 0.00
labor productivity 0.92 0.02 -4.22 0.00
white collar labor share 1.50 0.12 5.11 0.00
imported input share 0.90 0.05 -1.97 0.05
inputs/employee 0.98 0.01 -1.63 0.10
energy/employee 0.98 0.01 -2.03 0.04
average wage 0.90 0.02 -5.14 0.00
1978-1989
Note: The baseline hazard is allowed to vary over region-industry-startyear groups. All
standard errors are clustered on plants. Labor productivity, inputs/employee,
energy/employee and the average wage are measured as the percent difference from
the value in average plant in the industry-year group.
Table 5: Hazards with Additional Plant CharacteristicsForeign Owners and Plant Survival 22
Specification Variable Hazard Ratio Std.Err. z p-value
(X) foreign - greenfield 1.22 0.12 2.06 0.04
foreign - takeover 1.41 0.23 2.08 0.04
domestic - takeover 1.05 0.09 0.52 0.61
public 0.97 0.07 -0.50 0.62
log employment 0.60 0.01 -32.56 0.00
labor productivity 0.86 0.01 -13.83 0.00
white collar labor share 1.37 0.11 4.06 0.00
imported input share 0.91 0.05 -1.85 0.06
Note: The baseline hazard is allowed to vary over region-industry-startyear groups. All
standard errors are clustered on plants. Labor productivity is measured as the percent
difference in value-added per worker from the average plant in the industry-year group.
1978-1989
Table 6: Greenﬁeld and Takeovers
1975-1989
Specification Variable Hazard Ratio Std.Err. z p-value
(XI) foreign - minority 1.30 0.22 1.58 0.11
foreign - majority 1.24 0.12 2.31 0.02
public 0.97 0.07 -0.50 0.62
log employment 0.60 0.01 -32.57 0.00
labor productivity 0.86 0.01 -13.84 0.00
white collar labor share 1.36 0.10 4.03 0.00
imported input share 0.91 0.05 -1.86 0.06
Note: The baseline hazard is allowed to vary over region-industry-startyear groups. All
standard errors are clustered on plants. Labor productivity is measured as the percent
difference in value-added per worker from the average plant in the industry-year group.
Table 7: Minority vs. Majority OwnershipForeign Owners and Plant Survival 23
Note: Median foreign ownership share is 0.70; mean foreign ownership share is 0.67.  82% of the plants with 
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function by ownership
type, 1975-1989